Introduction
In late October 2005, the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization ('UNESCO') adopted the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions ('UNESCO Convention'), 3 which declares that 'cultural activities, goods and services have both an economic and a cultural nature … and must therefore not be treated as solely having commercial value'. 4 Of the 156 countries voting on the convention, 148 voted in favour, with opposing votes by Israel and the United States, and abstentions by Australia, Honduras, Liberia, and Nigeria. 5 The convention will enter into force three months after its ratification by 30 States. of particular importance for the WTO given the legitimacy and scope of UNESCO as an international organisation, 9 the formality and speed of its operations on this question, 10 and the possibility of a conflict with WTO rules. Of specific potential concern to WTO Members is the impact of the UNESCO Convention on the conduct of WTO Members in WTO negotiations and disputes, and the relationship between the UNESCO Convention and WTO laws. The broad scope of the UNESCO Convention could create difficulties for the WTO treatment of many arguably 'cultural' or culture-related goods and services such as audiovisual products; books and periodicals; food, wine and spirits (especially those subject to geographical indications or otherwise of regional significance); and tourism.
In this article, I first set out a brief background to the UNESCO Convention, including the circumstances of its conclusion and its key features. I then analyse the implications of the UNESCO Convention for the WTO, paying particular attention to the ongoing Doha Round of trade negotiations and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
Background to the UNESCO Convention
A.
History of the UNESCO Convention
The issue of trade and culture has long been debated in the WTO and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 ('GATT 1947') , 11 leading to a stalemate in the Uruguay Round of negotiations in connection with audiovisual products in particular. 12 From a 'pro-culture' perspective, some commentators have always contended that the best possibility for improving the current WTO rules in relation to cultural products would be to reach an agreement on trade and culture outside the WTO. 13 In a non-WTO forum, the B.
Key Features of the UNESCO Convention
In this section, I outline some of the key features of the UNESCO Convention and their connection to certain WTO rules. One of the express objectives of the UNESCO Convention in particular highlights its relevance for the WTO. It is 'to give recognition to the distinctive nature of cultural activities, goods and services as vehicles of identity, values and meaning '. 34 In pursuing this objective, the UNESCO Convention has a broad scope of application, covering those 'policies and measures adopted by the Parties the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions', 35 which are expressions resulting from 'the creativity of individuals, groups and societies, and that have cultural content '. 36 In turn, 'cultural content' refers to 'the symbolic meaning, artistic dimension and cultural values that originate from or express cultural identities'.
37 Some WTO Members have expressed concern about these sweeping definitions, which could extend to an almost unlimited range of products including 'computer games, designer objects, architectural services, medical services, tourism services, automobiles, steel, textiles, copper, or even rice'.
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The substance of the UNESCO Convention begins with certain 'Guiding Principles' in Article 2. These include: the '[p]rinciple of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'; 39 the '[p]rinciple of sovereignty', which declares that 'States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to adopt measures and policies to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions within their territory'; 40 and the '[p]rinciple of openness and balance', whereby States adopting 'measures to support the diversity of cultural expressions … should seek to promote … openness to other cultures of the world'.
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These general principles are followed by a series of provisions setting out both rights and obligations of parties. An example of a 'right' is found in Article 6, which states that parties 'may adopt measures aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions within its territory', 42 such as 'public financial assistance' 43 and 'opportunities … for the creation, production, dissemination, distribution and enjoyment of … domestic cultural activities, goods and services'.
44 Such measures could be inconsistent with national treatment obligations in the WTO, 45 (which, broadly speaking, require Members to treat foreign goods and services no less favourably than domestic goods and services). Another right that could be exercised contrary to national treatment is in Article 8, which could be described as a cultural safeguard. It states that a party 'may determine the existence of special situations where cultural expressions on its territory are at risk of extinction, under serious threat, or otherwise in need of urgent safeguarding'. 46 In such a situation, parties 'may take all appropriate measures to protect and preserve cultural expressions … in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Convention'. 47 The 'obligations' under the UNESCO Convention could also raise national treatment concerns in a WTO context. For example, Article 7.1(a) provides for parties to 'endeavour to create in their territory an environment which encourages individuals and social groups to create, produce, disseminate, distribute and have access to their own cultural expressions'.
Other UNESCO Convention provisions could conflict with most-favoured nation ('MFN') obligations under the WTO agreements, which essentially require WTO Members not to accord goods or services from any other country an advantage that is not accorded to all WTO Members. Article 12 requires parties to 'endeavour to strengthen their bilateral, regional and international cooperation for the creation of conditions conducive to the promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions, … notably in order to … encourage the conclusion of co-production and co-distribution agreements', 48 among other things. Similarly, Article 16 states:
Developed countries shall facilitate cultural exchanges with developing countries by granting, through the appropriate institutional and legal frameworks, preferential treatment to artists and other cultural professionals and practitioners, as well as cultural goods and services from developing countries.
The broad nature of this requirement could encourage WTO Members to impose measures that are inconsistent with the general MFN rule in the WTO, and not exempted by any WTO provisions for special and differential treatment of developing countries.
The UNESCO Convention also includes a dispute settlement mechanism in Article 25. This requires parties to 'seek a solution by negotiation' in the event of a dispute 'concerning the interpretation or the application of the Convention'. 49 Failing that, parties may jointly seek the good offices of or mediation by a third party. 50 The final option is non-binding conciliation conducted by a 'Conciliation Commission'.
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Finally, of interest is Part V of the convention, governing 'Relationship to Other Instruments'. Article 20.2 states that '[n]othing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying rights and obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to which they are parties'. However, this apparently clear statement could conflict with certain other provisions in this part. Article 20.1 states that parties 'shall foster mutual supportiveness between this Convention and the other treaties to which they are parties' and that, 'when interpreting and applying other treaties to which they are parties or when entering into other international obligations, Parties shall take into account the relevant provisions of this Convention'. Article 21 states, furthermore, that parties 'undertake to promote the objectives and principles of this Convention in other international forums' and to consult each other as appropriate for this purpose. Perhaps these two requirements apply only to the extent that they do not involve modifying rights or obligations under other treaties. The provisions of the UNESCO Convention dealing with dispute settlement and the relationship to other instruments were among the most controversial in finalising the text.
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They were modified in successive versions and ultimately watered down. For example, an earlier draft included the possibility of referring disputes to the International Court of Justice ('ICJ') for resolution, 53 and an option whereby the UNESCO Convention would prevail over existing international instruments (other than those relating to intellectual property) where the exercise of rights and obligations under such instruments 'would cause serious damage or threat to the diversity of cultural expressions'. 
Implications for the WTO
This section considers the formal role of WTO Members leading up to the adoption of the UNESCO Convention, followed by the possible effect of the UNESCO Convention (should it enter into force) on the conduct in WTO negotiations and disputes of WTO Members that are also UNESCO Convention parties. The section ends with a discussion of the potential significance of the UNESCO Convention in interpreting WTO provisions and as a defence to a WTO violation.
A. WTO Members' Views on the UNESCO Convention
The Director-General of UNESCO sought feedback from the WTO Secretariat on the UNESCO Convention, and the WTO Director-General put this request to the WTO Members through the relevant bodies. The vast majority of WTO Members, who were also involved in the drafting of the UNESCO Convention, would ideally present the same views on the draft within UNESCO and the WTO. 58 However, the need to seek WTO Members' views separately may have stemmed in part from the fact that different government representatives, from different ministries, may be involved in these two contexts. Normally one would expect a representative from a ministry dealing with culture to attend UNESCO meetings and a representative from a ministry dealing with international trade to attend WTO meetings.
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Australia has therefore emphasised the need for 'appropriate inter-agency coordination to guarantee a whole-of-government approach' in relation to the UNESCO Convention. 
Conduct of UNESCO Convention Parties in the WTO
A WTO Member that was also a party to the UNESCO Convention might wish to refrain from making offers in the ongoing negotiations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services ('GATS') regarding audiovisual services. Such conduct would be unlikely to violate any WTO obligations. The design of GATS is intentionally flexible, so that no WTO Member is legally bound under the WTO agreements to make commitments in any particular service sector, whether or not they have committed to do so or to refrain from doing so under another international instrument. However, the Member would likely have to 'pay' for its refusal to improve commitments in relation to cultural products as part of its overall negotiating package. 66 Any negotiating trade-off could affect other Members with interests in the sectors concerned. Moreover, for the WTO as an institution, and the WTO Members as a whole, widespread reliance on the UNESCO Convention in WTO negotiations would be contrary to the WTO objective of pursuing progressive liberalisation under GATS and the WTO more generally.
67 Accordingly, in response to UNESCO's request for comments on the draft UNESCO Convention, several WTO Members expressed concern about this potential impact on WTO negotiations.
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A WTO Member that was also a party to the UNESCO Convention might wish to challenge a trade measure of another WTO Member and party to the UNESCO Convention on the basis that it violated rights and obligations contained in the UNESCO Convention. In these circumstances, the question would arise whether the WTO Member could choose to bring the dispute within the dispute settlement mechanism established by the UNESCO Convention, rather than within the WTO dispute settlement system. Indeed, some Members have raised concerns about the potential for conflict between dispute settlement in these two settings.
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Article 23.1 of the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ('DSU') states:
When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding. This suggests that a Member that chooses to 'seek the redress' of a violation of a WTO agreement cannot do so through any means other than the WTO dispute settlement system. This is confirmed by Article 23.2(a), which states that, '[i]n such cases', Members shall 'not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with' the DSU. One WTO panel has described Article 23 as incorporating the 'fundamental principle' that the WTO dispute settlement system provides 'the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement'.
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To date, these provisions have been raised in WTO disputes in response to unilateral actions by Members.
71 However, the 'exclusive' nature of Article 23 could also restrict a WTO Member from pursuing a dispute in another forum, such as under the UNESCO Convention. Marceau, for example, considers that Article 23 precludes Members from taking 'their WTO-related disputes … to another forum'. 72 In my view, this would depend on the nature of the dispute and the steps taken by the complaining Member towards its resolution. If the Member was challenging a measure on the basis that it violated the UNESCO Convention, it would arguably not be seeking the redress of a 'violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements' within the meaning of Article 23.1 of the DSU. It could therefore pursue the dispute pursuant to the UNESCO Convention without violating any WTO obligations.
What if a WTO Member decided, in view of its commitments under the UNESCO Convention, to refrain from pursuing a WTO dispute in relation to a cultural policy measure imposed by another WTO Member and party to the UNESCO Convention because the measure pursued the objectives of the UNESCO Convention, even though it appeared to be inconsistent with the WTO agreements? Instead, the first Member might simply consult with the other Member, as envisaged under Article 21 of the UNESCO Convention. If the purpose of the consultations was to raise concerns about WTO violations, this might involve 'seek[ing] the redress' of a WTO violation other than through the WTO dispute settlement system, contrary to Article 23.1 of the DSU. On the other hand, it would seem to go too far to interpret Article 23.1 of the DSU as preventing WTO Members from resolving WTO disputes amicably, without resorting to formal consultations within the WTO dispute settlement system. 73 This would also be unrealistic. In practice, Members frequently engage in informal consultations before commencing formal proceedings. To preclude such an avenue of dispute resolution would be contrary to the aim of the dispute settlement system, which is to resolve disputes, preferably through a 'mutually agreed solution'.
74 Accordingly, as long as WTO Members do not seek to resolve disputes regarding the WTO-consistency of their measures through formal dispute settlement under the UNESCO Convention, Article 23.1 would not appear to preclude them from consulting each other to resolve a dispute taking into account the objectives of that convention.
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In this way, the UNESCO Convention could assist Members in resolving disputes about cultural policy measures without resorting to formal dispute settlement. 76 If both Members were party to the UNESCO Convention, the terms of the UNESCO Convention could provide a useful background for consultations, as a set of principles and objectives on which they agree. However, from an institutional perspective, mutually agreed solutions are not always ideal. Thus, Article 3.7 of the DSU states that a 'solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred'.
77 A mutually agreed solution to a dispute that has been formally raised in the WTO system must be consistent with the covered agreements and must be notified to the WTO Membership through the DSB. 78 However, where Members resolve their disputes amicably without taking any formal steps towards resolution within the WTO (specifically through a formal request for consultations), other Members may be unaware of the existence of the dispute and the way in which it is resolved. This lack of transparency and focus on WTO-consistent dispute resolution could conflict with the objective of the WTO dispute settlement system as 'a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system'.
C.
The obligations'. 80 Similarly, the Appellate Body itself has stated that it has 'difficulty in envisaging circumstances in which a panel could add to the rights and obligations of a Member of the WTO if its conclusions reflected a correct interpretation and application of provisions of the covered agreements'. 81 In its first appeal, in 1996, the Appellate Body identified Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ('VCLT') as expressing 'a fundamental rule of treaty interpretation' that had 'attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law' and was, therefore, a rule to be applied in interpreting the WTO agreements in accordance with Article 3.2 of the DSU. 82 The Appellate Body confirmed that GATT 1994 'is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law'. 83 Since then, the Appellate Body has confirmed the status of the interpretative rules in the VCLT on several occasions. 84 The Appellate Body appears to have used international law in interpreting WTO provisions primarily based on Article 31(1) of the VCLT, and in particular in determining the 'ordinary meaning' of particular words. 85 In addition, the Appellate Body has sometimes referred to international law in apparent reliance on Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. 86 International laws outside the WTO framework, including the UNESCO Convention upon its entry into force, might assist in clarifying various exceptions to core WTO disciplines such as national treatment and MFN treatment in connection with cultural products. For example, Article XX(f) of GATT 1994 provides an exception to core WTO disciplines such as national treatment for measures 'imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value', subject to compliance with the chapeau. This provision has not yet been subject to interpretation in WTO dispute settlement, but the UNESCO Convention might have some influence on the ordinary meaning of 'national treasures' (which is likely to evolve over time) 87 and whether the exception should be seen as extending to measures imposed by one WTO Member to protect national treasures of other WTO Members. Similarly, the UNESCO Convention might be used to buttress a Member's claim that 'public morals' under the exceptions in GATS Article XIV(a) and GATT Article XX(a) include cultural concerns. However, provisions of the UNESCO Convention are likely to apply at most to the disputing parties and not to the WTO Membership as a whole, such that it would be difficult to bring the UNESCO Convention in through Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. 88 The Appellate Body's approach to this question may be revealed in the coming months should the decision in the EC biotech case be appealed.
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D.
The UNESCO Convention as a Defence to a WTO Violation A WTO Member might wish to challenge a cultural policy measure taken by another Member in applying or implementing the UNESCO Convention. A Member arguing that the convention provides a defence to a WTO violation independently of any of the express exceptions mentioned above would need to overcome two hurdles. First, it would need to establish that panels and the Appellate Body are entitled (or obliged), in resolving WTO disputes, to apply international laws not specifically set out in the WTO agreements. Second, it would need to show that the relevant conflict rules mean that, to the extent of inconsistency, the provision of the UNESCO Convention requiring or permitting the challenged measure prevails over the WTO provision prohibiting that measure. I consider these issues in turn below.
If the Appellate Body accepted a provision of the UNESCO Convention or a similar instrument as an independent defence to a WTO violation, it would be applying that instrument in a WTO dispute, rather than merely using it as an aid to interpretation in the manner discussed in the previous section. The application of public international law in WTO disputes is more controversial and problematic than its use in interpreting WTO provisions. The DSU makes fairly clear that panels and the Appellate Body are restricted to hearing claims under WTO agreements. 90 However, the DSU does not clearly specify whether panels and the Appellate Body may apply international law in resolving WTO claims.
The second sentence of Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the dispute settlement system 'serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law'. Commentators such as Marceau and Trachtman regard this sentence, as well as other DSU provisions, as precluding resort to customary international law rules other than interpretative rules. 91 In contrast, Pauwelyn maintains that
